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No decision in recent memory has generated as much interest and is of
such potentially sweeping scope as the Supreme Court's decision in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.' Already, the decision has been characterized as
"startling" and a "surprising departure from ingrained federal pleading
rules."'2 As one court has observed in the aftermath of Twombly, "[flew

* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP; Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Loyola University
Chicago School of Law; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; M.B.A., The University of
Chicago; B.S./B.A., State University of New York at Buffalo. The views expressed in this Article
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of Kirkland & Ellis LLP or its
clients.
1. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 296 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008)
(noting "'some uncertainty concerning the scope of' Twombly" (citing Commercial Money Ctr., Inc.
v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 337 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007)); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 431-32 (2008) ("In a startling move by the U.S. Supreme Court, the
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issues in civil procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading
standards, which are the key that opens access to courts." 3 As a result, the
decision has been the subject of significant debate.
In Twombly, the Court offered a potentially revolutionary gloss on
traditional notice pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The decision on its face purports to do nothing more than
interpret the plain language of Rule 8(a). Nonetheless, in doing so, the
Court articulates a standard that requires more searching scrutiny of the
pleadings, which now must not merely put a defendant on "notice" of the
claims against it, but must state those claims in a manner that demonstrates
that plaintiffs' entitlement to relief is "plausible".4
This plausibility standard has been the focus of intense scrutiny. Some
members of the academy and judiciary already have sought to limit the
scope of the Court's decision and its new standard, claiming that it is
"vague," "less than pellucid," or has caused "significant uncertainty." 5 A
careful reading of the Court's decision, however, demonstrates that this
angst is largely unwarranted. The majority in Twombly undertook a careful
analysis based on the text and purpose of the Federal Rules, articulating a
standard that is relatively clear. The Court has made plain that, in its
opinion, the Federal Rules always required that at a minimum plaintiffs must
state a claim that is logically coherent-i.e., the allegations in plaintiffs'
complaint must be both necessary and sufficient to establish defendant's
liability. This Article maintains that this logical coherence requirement is
largely the aim of the Court's plausibility standard, that the Court correctly
held that this requirement was mandated by the Federal Rules, and that it is

seventy-year-old liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) has been
decidedly tightened (if not discarded) in favor of a stricter standard requiring the pleading of facts
painting a 'plausible' picture of liability."); Linda S. Mullenix, Troubling Twombly, NAT'L L.J., June
11, 2007, at 13 (Twombly is "a surprising departure from ingrained federal pleading rules.").
3. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).
4. Several courts have noted that, under Twombly, scrutiny of the pleadings must be stringent.
See, e.g., Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he Twombly standard is
even more favorable to dismissal of a complaint" than prior formulations.).
5. Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008)
(observing that "the exact parameters of the Twombly decision are not yet known"); Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) ("We are not the first to acknowledge that the new
formulation is less than pellucid."); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 230, 234 (Twombly is "confusing" and
"[t]he issues raised by Twombly are not easily resolved, and likely will be a source of controversy for
years to come."); lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (Twombly has created
"[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings"), rev'd,
No. 07-1015, 2009 WL 1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009); Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d
538, 541 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Significant 'uncertainty as to the intended scope of the Court's decision
[in Twombly]' persists, however, particularly regarding its reach beyond the antitrust context."
(quoting lqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58)); Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181, 188 n.7 (4th Cir.
2007) ("In the wake of Twombly, courts and commentators have been grappling with the decision's
meaning and reach.").
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indeed, as the majority observed, an appropriate and necessary standardparticularly in light of the increasing costs associated with defending a claim
in the federal courts.
Part I of this Article discusses the various opinions issued in Twombly. 6
The majority opinion contained a careful analysis of the text and policy
underlying Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding
that, while the rules establish a system of "notice pleading," they do not
contemplate that plaintiffs may pursue claims that are entirely speculative or
that merely "possibly" entitle them to relief.7 Rather, they require that
plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims are "plausible," which flows from
Rule 8(a)'s requirement that plaintiffs make a "showing" that they are
entitled to relief The majority rejected any assertion that it was imposing
new or heightened pleading requirements.9 Rather, it made clear its belief
that these requirements were consistent with the text and intent of the
Federal Rules.10
Part II discusses limitations of the Court's decision suggested to date."
Some commentators and judges have suggested that Twombly may be
limited to the antitrust context, to complex cases, or by prior or subsequent
precedent.12 None of these purported limitations finds support in the Court's
decision, however.' 3 Rather, the Court made plain that its ruling was
dictated by the text of the Federal Rules, which do not manifest any
limitations aimed at particular categories of cases.' 4 Nor did the Court
suggest any such limitations either in the body of its opinion or in
subsequent rulings.' 5 In fact, the Court specifically rejected many of the
same arguments in its decision.' 6 Accordingly, the judicial (albeit early)
consensus is that no such limitations exist.
Part III discusses the proper interpretation of the Twombly decision. 7
While some courts and commentators have suggested that the Court's

6. See infra notes 33-132 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See infra Part I.A.1.
9. See infra Part I.A. 1.
10. See infra Part I.A.I.
11. See infra notes 133-168 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part lI.A-D (discussing the purported antitrust limitation, the complex case
limitation, subsequent decision limitation, and the existing precedent limitation).
14. See infra Part II.A-D.
15. See infra Part II.C-D.
16. See infra Part II.C-D.
17. See infra notes 169-189 and accompanying text.
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"plausibility" standard is less than clear, a careful reading of the Court's
decision demonstrates that its meaning is plain.18 The Court sought to
articulate a requirement it believed was firmly rooted in the text of the
rules-that the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint must be logically
coherent in the sense that, if accepted as true, they are necessary and
sufficient to establish a cause of action.' 9 Pleadings that do not allege the
necessary elements of a cause of action by definition do not meet the
requirement under Rule 8(a) that a plaintiff demonstrate entitlement to legal
relief.2° As the Court made clear, the mere "possibility" that a plaintiff may
be entitled to relief is not enough. 2 The allegations must assert a logically
22
coherent theory that, if accepted as true, would entitle plaintiff to relief.
This interpretation of the rules is fully justified. It is consistent with their
language as well as what we know about the drafters' intent. 3
Part IV addresses Twombly in the context of other recent Supreme Court
pleading decisions as well as the changing landscape of civil litigation under
the Federal Rules.24 The Court has made clear in a variety of contexts that
judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage is critical in modem litigation. 25 It has
issued several recent rulings in the securities context, for example, that have
imposed stringent requirements for stating a claim under the federal
securities laws. 6 In doing so, the Court has noted the congressional desire
to curb out-of-control litigation practices as well as the increasing costs of
defending claims in the federal system. 27 These increasing costs and the
broad scope of modem discovery must be counterbalanced by appropriately
stringent scrutiny of the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims early in the
litigation.2 8 This is the context in which Twombly was decided. To properly
interpret the case, one must view it within the broader context of the Court's
decisions regarding threshold pleading requirements
as well as the evolution
29
of civil practice under the Federal Rules.
Finally, Part V discusses the potential criticisms of the Twombly
decision.30 Once Twombly is properly understood as imposing a logical
coherence requirement on the initial pleadings, many of the objections
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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See infra notes 169-189 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part IIIA.
See infra Part IIIB.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra notes 169-189 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 190-223 and accompanying text.
Id.
See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 207-223 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 224-39 and accompanying text.
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voiced to date simply drop by the wayside.3 Such a requirement is plainly
consistent with the text of Rule 8(a) as well as with the Federal Rules
construed as a whole. Moreover, it also finds strong support in the Court's
prior decisions as well as the prevailing practice in the lower courts. 2
Not only is the Court's decision plainly justified under the rules, but it
also is desirable from a policy perspective. As the costs of litigation
increase and the scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent
pleading standards increases. It is neither efficient nor fair to allow claims
of dubious merit to proceed when doing so may lead to settlements that are
not based on the underlying merits, but rather the potential costs associated
with defending a lawsuit in our modem civil justice system. Twombly thus
presents a welcome clarification of modem pleading standards that is likely
to increase the efficiency and fairness of civil proceedings.
I. THE TWOMBLY OPINIONS
In Twombly, the parties asked the Supreme Court to address the
pleading standards under the Federal Rules in the context of an antitrust
conspiracy claim.33 Specifically, consumers brought a purported class action
against a variety of local telephone carriers alleging that they had engaged in
a conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations.

34

Plaintiffs alleged that this conspiracy was designed to hinder the entry of
rival firms in the local telephone and Internet service markets and thereby
restrain competition.35 In addition, they alleged that the defendants entered
into agreements to avoid competing against one another.3 6 As a result, they

31. See infra
notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
33. 127 S. Ct. at 1955.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Supreme Court had held that "[t]he crucial question" in assessing
whether § I was violated is whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct "stem[s] from independent
decision or from an agreement." Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540 (1954). Evidence of parallel "business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from
which" agreement may be inferred, but does not "conclusively establish agreement or ... itself
constitute[ ]a Sherman Act offense." Id. at 540-41.
35. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1962.
36. Id.
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maintained, consumers of these services were forced to pay higher rates than
they would have if defendants had not taken such actions. 7
The defendants were companies created as a result of the 1984 break-up
of AT&T, which established a system of regional monopolies that provided
local telephone service in conjunction with a competitive market for longdistance service from which these local monopolies were excluded.38 In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress subsequently prohibited this
monopoly status and authorized these local carriers to enter the longdistance market, restructuring the industry in an attempt to facilitate
competition.3 9 Nonetheless, plaintiffs alleged that these companies' anticompetitive conduct persisted, harming
consumers through increased fees
40
for telephone and Internet services.

The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that they
had alleged only parallel business conduct and not the agreement to restrain
trade necessary to state a cause of action under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 41 In
so ruling, it emphasized that plaintiffs had failed to allege facts that would
"exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for
'
defendants' parallel behavior."42
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
the allegations supporting parallel action were sufficient to state a claim
because defendants failed to show that there was "no set of facts" under
which plaintiffs could demonstrate that the parallelism alleged in the
complaint was the result of collusion among the defendants rather than
coincidence. 43 The appellate court specifically ruled that "plus factors" that
would exclude independent self-interest as a motivation for parallel conduct
"are not required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel
conduct to survive dismissal." 44
Defendants filed a petition for certiorari asking the Supreme Court to
resolve this dispute regarding the appropriate standard under Federal Rule of

37. Id.
38. Id. at 1961-62.
39. 110 Stat. 56 (1996). As the Court observed in Twombly, this Act was designed to
"fundamentally restructure[ ] local telephone markets" by, among other things, requiring each local
carrier "to share its network with competitors." 127 S. Ct. at 1961 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999) and Verizon Comm'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004)).
40. As the Court in Twombly observed, the defendants had "vigorously litigated" the scope of
their obligation to share their networks with potential competitors and obtained some success,
resulting in the FCC revising its regulations to "narrow the range of network elements to be shared"
with potential competitors. 127 S. Ct. at 1961-62.
41. Twombly v. Bell At. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (2007).
42. Id.
43. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).
44. Id.
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Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).45 That rule requires "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."4 6 In Conley v.
Gibson, the Court had previously interpreted this language as requiring a
plaintiff to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ...claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.
The question presented in Twombly
effectively called upon the Court to revisit this longstanding interpretation of
the Federal Rules and its notice pleading requirement and to determine
whether, as the Court in Conley suggested, "a complaint should not be
dismissed... unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
'
set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle him to relief."
4
Given the significance and potentially controversial nature of this
question, the Twombly decision was remarkably cohesive. Seven Justices
joined a strong majority opinion authored by Justice Souter. Only Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg dissented. 49 The majority's decision contains a
thorough and thoughtful analysis of both the text and underlying policy
rationale behind the Federal Rules and traditional notice pleading standards.
In the process, the Court articulated a strong vision of the judicial role in
assessing the legal sufficiency of the pleadings early in the litigation, one
that will likely have a sweeping effect on civil litigation in the federal
system.
A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority made clear that the issue before it was a simple one. It
observed that under the Sherman Act, "'[t]he crucial question' is whether the
challenged anticompetitive conduct 'stem[s] from independent decision or
from an agreement, tacit or express."' 5 "Even 'conscious parallelism,' a
common reaction of 'firms in a concentrated market [that] recogniz[e] their
shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to
price and output decisions' is 'not in itself unlawful."' 51 Accordingly, the
Sherman Act required that plaintiffs plead an agreement among the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
Corp.,
51.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Id. at 45-46.
See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1964 (majority opinion) (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954)).
Id. (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227

(1993)).
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defendants that was designed to restrain trade. "Unilateral" conduct was not
sufficient to demonstrate an antitrust conspiracy. 2
The question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs' complaint
sufficiently pleaded this element. The majority began its analysis by
repeating the standard characterization of Rule 8(a) as establishing a system
of "notice pleading": The rule, the majority observed, "requires only 'a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests."' 53 Under this standard, a plaintiff need not
make "detailed factual allegations. 54 However, a plaintiff cannot merely
rest on "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action."55 Rule 8(a) requires that a plaintiff provide "grounds" for
the plaintiff's alleged "entitle[ment] to relief. '56 Accordingly, "[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level."57

1. Textual Analysis
Having articulated these general principles, the Court proceeded to
elaborate on the traditional notice pleading requirements. It held that in
pleading a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that
'
its claim is "plausible."58
The majority distinguished this standard from a
"probability" standard, which would impose a higher burden on plaintiffs. 59
A plaintiff was not required to allege facts that demonstrate a "probability"
that it was entitled to relief; rather, it was merely required to provide a
showing that its claim was "plausible." 60 Nor could a judge dismiss a
plaintiffs complaint based on his or her experienced belief that plaintiffs
ability to recover was "remote and unlikely.",6' Rather, the inquiry must
focus on the sufficiency of the pleadings and whether on their face they state
a valid claim.

52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
54. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974. As the Court observed, this requirement was articulated in
Conley. See id. at 1965 n.3 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
55. Id. at 1964-65 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1965.
58. Id.
59. As the Court observed, "[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose
a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

1070
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Nonetheless, the majority's decision made clear that plaintiffs had to
include allegations in their complaint suggesting that they were entitled to
relief.62 It was not sufficient for a plaintiff to plead allegations that were
merely consistent with a defendant's liability.63 Such allegations could also
be consistent with the defendant being found not liable. The plausibility
standard, the Court underscored, was designed to ensure that plaintiffs cross
this threshold from equanimity between liability and non-liability to
a set of
64
allegations that were sufficient if taken as true to establish liability.
In articulating this test, the majority focused heavily on the text of Rule
8(a).65 In particular, it noted the rule's requirement that a plaintiff provide
"not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on which
the claim rests., 66 "The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly
suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 'plain statement'
possess enough heft to
'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief."'' 67
The Court thus "retire[d]" the "famous observation" in Conley v. Gibson
that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief., 68 The majority reasoned that
"[t]he phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may
be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in
the complaint. '69 According to the majority, the problem with the overlyliteral reading of Conley that plaintiffs urged and which some courts had
adopted was that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a
motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a
plaintiff might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts' to support

62. Id. at 1966.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
66. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 n.3.
67. Id. at 1966 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)). In fact, the majority went so far as to suggest that
"[p]laintiffs do not, of course, dispute the requirement of plausibility and the need for something
more than merely parallel behavior explained in Theatre Enterprises, Monsanto, and Matsushita."
Id. at 1968.
68. Id. at 1968-69 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The Court observed that
Conley's "'no set of facts' language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long
enough." Id. at 1959.
69. Id. at 1969.
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recovery."7 ° As a result, the Court noted that numerous courts had already
rejected "taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading
standard."'" Rather, according to the Court, they had followed something
akin to the plausibility standard.
At the same time, the majority expressly stated that it was not applying a
"heightened" pleading standard such as that for pleading fraud under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9.72 As the majority observed, imposing such a
requirement was beyond the purview of the courts.73 Rather, it could "only
be accomplished 'by the process of amending the Federal Rules."'' 74 As the
majority explained, "[h]ere, our concern is not that the allegations in the
complaint were insufficiently 'particular[ized]', rather, the complaint
warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs' entitlement
to relief plausible., 75 Thus, according to the majority, the plausibility test
flows directly from the text and does not impose a new pleading standard.
2. The Argument From Precedent
The Court also maintained that its interpretation of Rule 8(a) was
consistent with prior precedent. In particular, the Court observed that in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,76 it had previously held that
"something beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged,
lest a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless claim' be allowed to 'take up the
time of a number of other people, with the right
to do so representing an in
' 77
terrorem increment of the settlement value.'
Thus, the majority maintained that it had previously made clear that
allegations that merely established the "possibility" of relief were
insufficient under Rule 8(a). While it may not have fully articulated the
standard necessary to satisfy the Rule 8(a) requirement in prior decisions
such as Dura Pharmaceuticals, at a minimum the Court had previously
established what was not sufficient. The plausibility standard described by
the Court supplied this missing link, establishing the threshold standard that
must be met in order to state a legally sufficient claim under Rule 8.

70. Id. at 1968 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46).
71. Id. at 1969 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984);
Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544
F.2d 543, 546 n.3 (lst Cir. 1976); McGregor v. Indus. Excess Landfill, Inc., 856 F.2d 39, 42-43 (6th
Cir. 1988)).
72. Id. at 1973 n.14.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)).
75. 1d (internal citation omitted).
76. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
77. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347).
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3. Underlying Policy Concerns
Finally, the Court also noted the important policy implications of its
ruling. There is a basic tradeoff that must be made between the level of
scrutiny applied at the pleading stage and the costs associated with
continuing litigation. The Court reiterated the important function that
judicial scrutiny of the pleadings serves in the federal system. "[W]hen the
allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of
entitlement to relief, 'this basic deficiency should ...be exposed at the point78
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.,,
Thus, judicial scrutiny of the pleadings plays an important role in the
efficient conduct of civil litigation.
In particular, the majority appeared concerned that discovery costs were
only increasing for parties engaged in modem complex civil cases. It noted
specifically that "antitrust discovery can be expensive," observing by way of
example that Twombly was a putative class action brought on behalf of
millions of subscribers to local telephone and Internet services against major
telecommunications firms for conduct that occurred over a period of seven
years. 79 Thus, the potential for costly discovery in Twombly was significant.
More generally, the Court expressed a concern that discovery costs were
only increasing and that lawsuits were being settled based on their in
terrorem value rather than the actual merits of the case.
4. Application of the Plausibility Standard
Applying its newly-articulated standard, the Court found that plaintiffs'
complaint was deficient. 80 Plaintiffs had alleged that defendants engaged in
parallel conduct, but had failed to allege in anything other than a conclusory
manner that defendants entered into an agreement to restrain trade. 81 As the
Court observed, "[w]ithout more, parallel conduct does not suggest
conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified
point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality." 82 While plaintiffs'

78. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting WRIGHT &

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 1216, at 233-34).

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1967.
Id. at 1970.
Seeid. at 1962-63.
Id. at 1966. As the Court explained: "An allegation of parallel conduct is thus much like a

naked assertion of conspiracy in a § I complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but

without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitle[ment] to relief."' Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The Court noted that

1073

complaint did contain "a few stray statements speak[ing] directly of
agreement," the majority concluded that these were "merely legal
conclusions resting on the prior allegations. ' 3
As the Court reiterated, "[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations
plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the
threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 'plain statement' possess
enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ' ' 4 Thus, the
Court concluded, the complaint failed to meet the requirements of Rule 8
because it did not include a critical element that plaintiffs needed to
demonstrate to establish their claim. As the majority observed, the
allegations in the complaint were fully consistent with conduct constituting
"the natural, unilateral reaction of each [incumbent local exchange carriers]
intent on keeping its regional dominance." 85
B.

The Twombly Dissent

While achieving a broad consensus, the Twombly decision was not
The two dissenting members of the Court rejected the
unanimous.
majority's textual analysis, suggesting that it constituted a sweeping rewriting of the Federal Rules.86 In addition, they suggested that stringent
standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings were not particularly
necessary given that, in their view, there were other mechanisms available
under the Federal Rules for controlling unwarranted litigation costs and
dealing with claims that had little or no merit.8 7
1. Textual Analysis
The dissenters focused heavily on the notice aspect of the modem
federal pleading rules. They maintained that Rule 8(a)(2) was designed
simply to provide the other side with notice of the claims against it. As
"when allegations of parallel conduct are set out inorder to make a § I claim, they must be placed in
a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could
just as well be independent action." Id.
83. Id. at 1970.
84. Id. at 1966 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct
consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § I
claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a
defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory." Id.
85. Id. at 1971.
86. See id. at 1975-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1988-89 ("[T]hat the Court has announced
a significant new rule that does not even purport to respond to any congressional command is
glaringly obvious."); id. at 1989 (characterizing majority's decision as a "stark break from
precedent" and stating that it "marks a fundamental-and unjustified-change in the character of
pretrial practice").
87. See id. at 1987 n.13.
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such, the Federal Rules did not impose what the dissent characterized as a
"heightened" pleading standard. 8
In support of this conclusion, the dissent discussed at length the
evolution of the Federal Rules, noting that the modem rules emerged as a
rejection of prior approaches to pleading, which required the pleading of
specific facts. 89

According to Justice Stevens, the drafters of Rule 8

"intentionally avoided any reference to 'facts' or 'evidence' or
'conclusions,"' specifically because they were rejecting the prior fact
pleading requirements.9" "Under the relaxed pleading standards of the
Federal Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to
keep them in. The merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible
pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible of trial.'
The dissenters gave short shrift to Rule 8's requirement of a "showing,"
relegating their discussion of this requirement, which was the lynchpin of
the majority decision, to a footnote.92 While they acknowledged that the rule
did in fact require such a showing, they maintained that whether this
language "requires allegations of fact will depend on the particulars of the
claim." 93 The dissent explained that the plausibility requirement that the
majority articulated was different than the "showing" required under Rule 8
without elaborating at any length, other than suggesting that this language
was designed to prohibit conclusory allegations.94 Thus, for example, if the
pleadings had simply alleged that there was an "agreement" without more,
they may have run afoul of this requirement, which the dissent believed was
closely tied to the requirement that the complaint provide adequate notice. 95
Nonetheless, the dissent maintained that, even under the majority's
"plausibility" standard, the pleadings in Twombly were more than
sufficient.96
The dissent argued that in adopting the plausibility test, the majority had
imported a standard that was more appropriately applied at the summary
judgment stage. 97 It noted that the plausibility requirement had been

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Seeid. at 1983.
See id. at 1975-77.
Id. at 1976.
Id.
Id. at 1979 n.6.
Id. at 1980.
Id. at 1983.
Id. at 1985.
Id.
Id. at 1983.
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articulated in the Court's prior decision in MatsushitaElectric IndustrialCo.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 98 a case that involved a motion for summary
judgment on plaintiffs antitrust claims under Rule 56.99 The dissent argued
that the majority's decision was inconsistent with prior decisions that had
recognized that "a heightened production burden at the summary judgment
stage does
not translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint
10 0
stage."

The dissenters also pointed to Form 9 of the Federal Rules, which
provides a sample for pleading a negligence claim.1"'
The dissent
maintained that that form, which is notoriously cursory, demonstrated that
the drafters of the Federal Rules did not intend anything other than requiring
plaintiffs to provide notice to the other side regarding the general nature of
their claims. 10 2 Accordingly, the dissenters maintained, the majority's
opinion imposed a "heightened" pleading standard at odds with the Federal
Rules when read as a whole. 103

The majority rejected the dissent's suggestion that the standard it
articulated was inconsistent with Form 9, finding that the allegations in the
Twombly complaint were deficient in comparison with the requirements

98. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
99. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1982-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1983. Some courts have agreed that Twombly "abrogated" the traditional notice
pleading standard. See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008);
see also lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he Court's explanation for its holding
indicated that it intended to make some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading that had
prevailed in the federal courts ever since Conley v. Gibson."), rev'd, No. 07-1015, 2009 WL
1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009). Others have concluded that the Court did not entirely abrogate notice
pleading. See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[U]nder our
reading, the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) remains intact."); McZeal v. Sprint Nextel
Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 n.4, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Under Twombly, "a patentee need only plead
facts sufficient to place the alleged infringer on notice as to what he must defend"; Twombly did not
"change[] the pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 as articulated in Conley.").
Others have characterized Twombly as providing "a further articulation of the standard by which to
evaluate the sufficiency of all claims brought pursuant to Rule 8(a)." Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 n.43 (1 th Cir. 2008). Finally, other courts have stated that "the
opinion seeks to find a middle ground between 'heightened fact pleading,' which is expressly
rejected.... and allowing complaints that are no more than 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action."' Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1974). See also Spencer, supra note 2, at 431, 474
(arguing that, after Twombly, "[n]otice pleading is dead" and that "it is hard to distinguish the
Court's plausibility standard from the heightened pleading obligation of Rule 9(b)").
101. T vombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Form 9 has since been renumbered
under the restyling of the rules, effective December 2007, and is now Form 11.
102, Id.
103. Id. at 1984. See also lqbal, 490 F.3d at 156 (arguing that "[tfhe adequacy of a generalized
allegation of negligence in the approved Form 9 seems to weigh heavily against reading Bell Atlantic
to condemn the insufficiency of all legal conclusions in a pleading, as long as the defendant is given
notice of the date, time, and place where the legally vulnerable conduct occurred"), rev'd, 2009 WL
1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009).
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suggested in that form. As the majority observed:
Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck the
plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was crossing a particular
highway at a specified date and time, the complaint here furnishes
no clue as to which of the four [incumbent local exchange carriers]
(much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when
and where the illicit agreement took place.' °4
Moreover, as noted above,' °5 the majority specifically disavowed any
suggestion that it was imposing a "heightened" pleading standard requiring
particularity in the pleading of facts such as that embodied in Rule 9.
Rather, the majority maintained that it was simply interpreting Rule 8
according to its plain language and, moreover, that its interpretation of Rule
8 was in fact that generally accepted by the lower federal courts, which had
not adhered to a literal reading of the language in the Court's decision in
Conley.

2.

The Argument From Precedent

The dissent argued that the Conley formulation should not be so lightly
rejected given its longstanding pedigree. It maintained that, "[c]onsistent
with the design of the Federal Rules, Conley's 'no set of facts' formulation
permits outright dismissal only when proceeding to discovery or beyond
would be futile."'' 0 6 Accordingly, the dissent claimed that the Conley
language imposed only a minimal requirement that plaintiffs provide only
the most general notice of their claims. In the words of Justice Stevens, "[i]t
reflects a philosophy that, unlike in the days of code pleading, separating the
wheat from the chaff is a task assigned to the pretrial and trial process.' ' °
Moreover, the dissent claimed that the lower courts had in fact relied
extensively on the Conley formulation and that, accordingly, the majority's

104. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971 n.10 (majority opinion) ("A defendant wishing to prepare an
answer in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer; a defendant seeking
to respond to plaintiffs' conclusory allegations in the § 1 context would have little idea where to
begin.").
105. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
106. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[A]s the Conley Court well knew, the
pleading standard the Federal Rules meant to codify does not require, or even invite, the pleading of
facts." Id. at 1979.
107. Id. at 1981. "Conley's language, in short, captures the policy choice embodied in the Federal
Rules and binding on the federal courts. We have consistently reaffirmed that basic understanding
of the Federal Rules in the half century since Conley." Id.
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decision in Twombly represented a sea change in the pleading requirements
currently applied by the federal courts.'0 8 According to the dissent, the
Conley formulation had not been the subject of longstanding criticism, but
rather was an accepted description of the pleading standard embodied in
Rule 8.109 In the dissent's view, the majority's decision amounted to
"rewrit[ing] the Nation's civil procedure textbooks.""
3. Underlying Policy Concerns
The dissent characterized the majority's decision as being based, not on
the text of Rule 8, but rather on certain "practical concerns" regarding the
cost of modem litigation."' It conceded that antitrust litigation could be
''enormously expensive" and that "there is a risk that jurors may mistakenly
conclude that evidence of parallel conduct has proved that the parties acted
pursuant to an agreement when they in fact merely made similar independent
decisions."' 1 2 The dissent's solution to such problems was "careful case
management," which would include limitations on discovery, scrutiny of the
evidence at the summary judgment stage, and "lucid instructions to
juries.,113

Among the "case management" procedures the dissent cited were Rule
12(e)'s mechanism for requiring plaintiff to provide a more definite
statement of the claims contained in the complaint; Rule 7(a)'s authorization
for courts to require a plaintiff to reply to a defendant's answer; Rule 23's
requirements for "rigorous analysis""' 4 of a plaintiff's class allegations to
determine whether certification is appropriate; Rule 26's provisions allowing
judges to control the scope and sequence of discovery to prevent

108. See id. at 1977-78. Moreover, the dissent asserted that:
Taking their cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of Columbia utilize as
their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the majority repudiates:
whether it appears "beyond doubt" that "no set of facts" in support of the claim would
entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Id. at 1978.
109. See id. at 1978 (arguing that the Conley language "has been cited as authority in a dozen
opinions of this Court").
110. Id.at1979.
11. Id. at 1975, 1989 ("The transparent policy concem that drives the decision is the interest in
protecting antitrust defendants-who in this case are some of the wealthiest corporations in our
economy-from the burdens of pretrial discovery.").
112. Id. at 1975.
113. Id. The Supreme Court in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit had previously noted that "federal courts and litigants must rely on summary
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later." 507
U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
114. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1987.
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"annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense";"

5

and Rule 16's authorization of significant judicial involvement in pretrial
proceedings through pretrial conferences and scheduling orders that address
"the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings," "the control
and scheduling of discovery," and "the need for adopting special procedures
for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve
complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof
problems."'" 6 In addition, the dissent cited the sanctions provisions
contained in Rule 11 as a mechanism for curbing in terrorem suits." 7
The dissent recognized the potential dangers associated with allowing
plaintiffs to engage in potentially wide-ranging discovery based on the
admittedly cursory allegations in their complaint. As Justice Stevens
observed, "if I had been the trial judge in this case, I would not have
permitted the plaintiffs to engage in massive discovery based solely on the
allegations in this complaint.""' 8 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens believed that
case management provided the solution: "The potential for 'sprawling,
costly, and hugely time-consuming' discovery... is no reason to throw the
baby out with the bathwater."" 9
Here, the majority and dissent significantly departed company. The
majority rejected these assertions, noting "the common lament that the
success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been
modest." 120 In doing so, it relied heavily upon an article written by Judge
Easterbrook, cataloguing the numerous practical problems associated with
expecting judges to manage litigation so that dubious claims do not impose
unwarranted litigation costs.' 2' As Judge Easterbrook noted, trial judges are
generally not in a position to know whether certain discovery is appropriate
at the outset of the case based on the limited description of the dispute that
may be provided in plaintiffs' complaint. 2 2 Moreover, even where the
complaint provides a fair amount of detail, the judge cannot possibly predict

115. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)).
116. Id. at 1987 n.13. According to the dissent, "the Federal Rules contemplate that pretrial
matters will be settled through a flexible process of give and take, of proffers, stipulations, and
stonewalls, not by having trial judges screen allegations for their plausibility vel non without
requiring an answer from the defendant." Id. (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rodgers, 357 U.S. 197, 206 (1958)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1987.
120. Id. at 1959 (majority opinion).
121. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989).
122. Id. at638.
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what discovery might be fruitful and what discovery will constitute a waste
of the parties' time and resources. 123 As the Twombly majority observed,
"[t]he judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties
themselves may not know very well where they are going or what they
expect to find."' 124 Moreover, "[a] magistrate supervising discovery does
not-cannot-know the expected productivity of a given request, because
the nature of the requester's claim and the contents of the files (or head) of
the adverse party are unknown."' 125 Thus, Judge Easterbrook concluded, and
the Twombly majority agreed, that
[t]he portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure calling on judges to
trim back excessive demands.., have been, are doomed to be,
hollow. We cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot
detect what we cannot define; we cannot define "abusive" discovery
theory, because in practice we lack essential
except in 26
information. 1
Likewise, the majority rejected the dissent's proposal for limiting the
costs of discovery through "phased" discovery proceedings. 27 As the Court
observed, not only did such proposals suffer from the problems identified by
Judge Easterbrook, but in a complex case such as Twombly, even the initial
"phase" of discovery would prove "hugely time-consuming" and costly. 128
Accordingly, approaching discovery in a piecemeal fashion was unlikely to
solve the problem.
Finally, the majority rejected the dissent's reliance on summary
judgment procedures as providing a potential check on abusive litigation.
As the majority observed, summary judgment could not serve as an effective
check because the costs associated with discovery will be incurred before
such proceedings can be completed and "will push cost-conscious
defendants to settle even anemic cases.'

29

4. Application
The majority and the dissent thus had much different views concerning
the proper framework for evaluating the sufficiency of allegations at the
pleading stage. The dissent vigorously maintained that most, if not all,
123. Id.; see infra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
124. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968 (quoting Easterbrook, supranote 121, at 638-39).
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
128. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968.
129. Id. at 1967.
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claims should proceed to trial or at least be resolved at the summary
judgment stage, making extensive discovery a routine aspect of cases in the
federal system. 130 In particular, the dissent made clear that, in its view, the
fact that plaintiffs had alleged that there was an agreement among
defendants was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss in Twombly. 3' Its
approach to the evaluation of pleadings thus manifests an entirely different
worldview. While the dissent argued that the majority's decision was
inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Federal Rules, its opinion is
filled with language indicating its objections on policy grounds. 3 2 The
majority and the dissent manifested a fundamental difference of view
regarding the significance of the costs associated with modem litigation in
the federal system as well as the benefits of using trial to decide disputes as
opposed to judicial decision making.
II.

SUGGESTED LIMITATIONS ON TWOMBLY

In the wake of the potentially sweeping implications of Twombly,
commentators and some judges have suggested potential limitations on the
decision. However, none of these potential limitations have much, if any,
support in the Court's decision. To the contrary, the majority specifically
considered and expressly rejected many of these limitations. Accordingly,
the early decisions applying Twombly have not adopted these proposals to
artificially limit the Court's decision.
A.

The Antitrust Limitation

Some commentators have suggested that Twombly should be limited to
the antitrust context or that, at a minimum, its effect should not be as
sweeping outside the antitrust context. 133 They point to the Court's
130. Id. at 1985-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. See supranotes 111-29 and accompanying text.
133. Cf Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1047 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) ("At least for the
purposes of adequate pleading in antitrust cases, the Court specifically abrogated the usual 'notice
pleading' rule, found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and Conley v. Gibson."); see also
Keith Bradley, PleadingStandards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 Nw.
UL. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007) (arguing that Twombly is limited to antitrust and did not
"rework pleading rules across the board," but recognizing that courts had not adopted this
interpretation); Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 437 n.37
(2007) (maintaining that it is "not clear" whether Twombly "is really just about pleading in antitrust
cases"); Note, PleadingStandards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 310 n.51 (2007) ("Some scholars view
Twombly as primarily an antitrust case.").
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discussion of the significant litigation costs associated with antitrust cases as

well as its reliance on antitrust precedent arising in the summary judgment
context for its articulation of the plausibility standard as evidence
that the
34
Court was concerned only with antitrust pleading standards. 1
Nonetheless, there are no such distinctions in the text of Rule 8, which
was the purported basis for the Court's decision. Rule 8 applies equally to
antitrust cases and garden variety contract cases. Moreover, this neutrality is
an important characteristic of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.135 Not

only does having different rules for different kinds of cases find no support
in the text, but it would also be highly inefficient and would lead to potential

unfairness in the application of federal procedure.
Moreover, the same concerns justifying stringent scrutiny of the
pleadings arise not only in the antitrust context, but in other kinds of cases as
well. Thus, for example, the Twombly majority specifically noted the
potential for in terrorem litigation in the securities context. 136 Indeed, there

is a general trend toward increasing litigation costs across the board in the
federal system due to developments such as the increasing importance of
electronic discovery
and the increasing use of electronic media to store
37

information. 1
Finally, the "antitrust" precedent arising in the summary judgment
context, upon which the Twombly majority relied, articulated a general

standard based on the text of the Federal Rules that has been repeated
outside the antitrust context. 138 The Court's decision in Matsushita v.
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.139 is widely recognized as

stating the generally applicable standard for summary judgment under Rule
56.140 This standard is not limited to antitrust cases. So too, the Court's
134. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 (observing that "proceeding to antitrust discovery can be
expensive"); id. at 1968 (relying on Theatre Enterprises, Monsanto, and Matsushita for the
plausibility requirement); Bradley, supra note 133, at 117 (arguing that "plausibility" is "antitrust
jargon").
135. See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-SubstantiveRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067,
2074 (1989) (neutrality is "an obvious objective" and "paramount value" of the rules); but cf Judith
Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2219-20 (1989) (arguing that a lack of
neutrality has crept into the rules).
136. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
137. See generally Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE
L.J. 561, 590 (2001) ("[lit is reasonable to believe that the sheer volume of electronically stored data
will continue to increase dramatically the costs and burdens of electronic discovery relative to
traditional paper discovery.").
138. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968.
139. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
140. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1159, 1186 (2008) (noting
that, while some commentators initially argued that "the Supreme Court's Matsushita decisionTwombly's earlier analog for summary judgment"-was "seemingly based on antitrust-specific
concerns," it "has been used much more broadly in civil litigation"); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on

1082

[Vol. 36: 1063, 2009]

The Twombly Revolution?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

application of the plausibility standard at the pleadings stage in Twombly,
cannot be limited to antitrust cases. The majority articulated a standard
under Rule 8 that is broadly applicable to all civil cases. 4'
B.

The Complex Case Limitation

A related limitation that some commentators and courts have proposed
would circumscribe Twombly to complex cases. 142 Again, advocates of this

interpretation point to the Court's concerns with discovery costs as if this
were the sole basis for the Court's decision.' 43 However, again, the Court's
Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
770, 787 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson, Celotex, and Matsushita
"provid[e] a logical framework for deciding how and when [summary judgment] can be used").
141. As this Article was going to print, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ashcroft v. lqbal,
confirming that "Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,' ... and it applies
to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." No. 07-1015, 2009 WL 1361536, at *16 (U.S. May 18,
2009). See also, e.g., Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
2008 WL 5273309, at *7 n.2 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2008) ("This Court has cited the heightened pleading
standard of Twombly in a wide variety of cases, not simply limiting its applicability to antitrust
actions."); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) ("[W]e decline at
this point to read Twombly so narrowly as to limit its holding on plausibility to the antitrust
context."); ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) ("We have
declined to read Twombly's flexible 'plausibility standard' as relating only to antitrust cases."); Iqbal
v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[l~t would be cavalier to believe that the Court's
rejection of the 'no set of facts' language from Conley . . . applies only to section 1 antitrust
claims."), rev'd, No. 07-1015, 2009 WL 1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role
of Judges in a Government of by, andfor the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture,
30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 108 (2008).
142. Cf Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Courts in and out of the Sixth
Circuit have identified uncertainty regarding the scope of Twombly and have indicated that its
holding is likely limited to expensive, complicated litigation like that considered in Twombly.");
Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Under Bell Atlantic,
the complaint in a potentially complex litigation, or one that by reason of the potential cost of a
judgment to the defendant creates the 'in terrorem' effect against which Blue Chip warned, must
have some degree of plausibility to survive dismissal."); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249
(10th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that "[t]he Twombly standard may have greater bite" in cases involving
"complex claims against multiple defendants"); lqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58 (Twombly "is not
requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible
'plausibility standard,' which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in
those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible."), rev 'd, 2009 WL
1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009).
143. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967; Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d at 803 (observing that "[tlhe
Court was concerned lest a defendant be forced to conduct expensive pretrial discovery in order to
demonstrate the groundlessness of the plaintiff's claim"); Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157 (The majority's
concerns with the costs of discovery "provide some basis for believing that whatever adjustment in
pleading standards results from Bell Atlantic is limited to cases where massive discovery is likely to
create unacceptable settlement pressures."), rev'd, 2009 WL 1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009); Lonny
S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff With Unquenchable Fire: What Two DoctrinalIntersections Can
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decision relied primarily upon the text of the Federal Rules and thus cannot
be limited in this manner. It was not solely a policy-driven decision, but
rather a textually-based decision that had sound support in prior decisional
to
law interpreting Rule 8. Indeed, the majority went to great lengths
44
repudiate this assertion, which was specifically raised by the dissent.
Likewise, certain courts have suggested that the degree of specificity in
the complaint after Twombly "depends on context."'' 45 Thus, "[a] simple
negligence action based on an automobile accident may require little more
than the allegation that the defendant negligently struck the plaintiff with his
' 46
car while crossing a particular highway on a specified date and time."'
However, in more complex cases, such as the antitrust case that was the
subject of the Twombly decision, more extensive factual allegations may be
required.
While this interpretation may make some sense-obviously the
elements that must be pled are more numerous the more complex the case,
and there is a corresponding increase in the potential for logical gaps in the
pleadings-nonetheless, it is an imprecise oversimplification of the Twombly
approach. The Twombly majority specifically addressed the negligence

Teach Us About JudicialPower Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1237-38 (2008) ("[S]ome
have suggested that perhaps one way to read the decision in Twombly is to regard it as an effort by
the Court to impose heightened judicial scrutiny over pleadings but, simultaneously, to try to corral
the extent of the decision's reach by pegging the need for heightened judicial scrutiny to the risk of
exorbitant discovery costs.").
144. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.14, 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Scott Dodson,
Pleading StandardsAfter Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007)
(arguing that Twombly cannot be "cabined by the costs and expenses that might accrue": "The best
reading of Bell Atlantic is that the new standard is absolute, that mere notice pleading is dead for all
cases and causes of action."); Spencer, supra note 2, at 457 (rejecting the assertion that Twombly
"will not be applied to other cases or at least will not be applied to cases not presenting the
efficiency and judicial administration concerns pointed to by the Court in Twombly").
145. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 ("The Third Circuit has noted, and we agree, that the degree of
specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice, and therefore the need to include
(citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32)); cf
sufficient factual allegations, depends on context ....
Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d at 803 ("[H]ow many facts are enough will depend on the type of case. In
a complex antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found in the sample
complaints in the civil rules' Appendix of Forms may be necessary to show that the plaintiff's claim
is not 'largely groundless."' (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32)); Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58
(Twombly "is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring
a flexible 'plausibility standard,' which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual
allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible."),
rev'd, 2009 WL 1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of
Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured
Approach to FederalPleadingPractice,243 F.R.D. 604, 604 (2006) (observing that while the "fair
notice standard does not vary from one type of claim to another," nonetheless "what constitutes fair
notice under one circumstance may not necessarily constitute fair notice under another"); Spencer,
supra note 2, at 459 (arguing that "the Court's plausibility standard may require different levels of
factual detail depending upon the substantive context").
146. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. Form 9).
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example that is the subject of Form 9 of the Federal Rules. 147 It did not
indicate that the standard it articulated was any different for negligence4 9
cases. 148 To the contrary, it made clear that the standard was the same.1
Moreover, applying different procedural rules or standards to different kinds
of cases would be inconsistent with the rules' purported neutrality as well as
potentially lead to unwarranted inefficiency and complexity. 150 The
majority's decision makes clear that, in both the negligence and antitrust
context, plaintiffs must make plausible allegations, and in both contexts the
definition of plausibility is the same.'
C. LimitationsImposed By Subsequent Decisions
Some commentators have argued that the Court has limited the reach of

Twombly in subsequent decisions. In particular, they maintain that the Court
immediately reversed course by restating the general "notice pleading"
52
requirement in Erickson v. Pardus.'
There, the Court stated that "Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Specific facts are not

147. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971 n.10.
148. See id. at 1973 n.14 ("[W]e do not apply any 'heightened' pleading standard ...[and] the
complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs' entitlement to relief
plausible."); see also id. at 1974 ("[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but
only enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here
have not nudged their claim across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be
dismissed.").
149. Id.
150. See Spencer, supra note 2, at 460 (arguing that "a fluid, form-shifting standard is troubling"
because it "violates the principle of transubstantivity" and would "impose a more onerous burden in
those cases where a liberal notice pleading standard is needed most").
151. See generally Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955.
152. 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007). See, e.g., Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502
F.3d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "if
there was any doubt whether Twombly altered the pleading requirements, the Supreme Court put that
doubt to rest in Erickson v. Pardus"); lqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
"conflicting signals" given by the Court in Erickson by citing the traditional "fair notice"
formulation "just two weeks after issuing its opinion in Bell Atlantic"), rev'd, No. 07-1015, 2009
WL 1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009); Bradley, supra note 133, at 122 (arguing that in Erickson, "the
Court allowed a complaint based only on scant allegations ....
");Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at
437 n.38 (noting that in Erickson, the Court "reaffirmed traditional rules of notice pleading"); Ides,
supra note 145, at 604 (noting that "[a]t least at a surface level, Bell Atlantic and Erickson appear to
be in tension with one another"); Pleading Standards, supra note 133, at 310-11 n.51 ("Several
commentators have argued that Erickson shows that Twombly should be read less expansively than
some have suggested."). Some courts have cited Erickson as evidence that the Court intended to
articulate a flexible standard that was case specific. See Phillips,515 F.3d at 232.
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necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' 153

Not only is this interpretation of the Court's decisions fanciful, but it is
inconsistent with their plain language. Erickson merely quoted the "fair
notice" language of Twombly.15 4 It did not explicitly cut back on any of the
elaboration of that general standard contained in Twombly.' 55 Indeed, the
Twombly majority went to great lengths to underscore that it was not
imposing a heightened pleading standard or abandoning the "notice
pleading" incorporated in the Federal Rules.1 56 Rather, it reiterated that the

plausibility standard flowed directly from the text of Rule 8."' The
Accordingly,
language in Erickson is thus fully consistent with Twombly.
58
courts considering similar arguments have rejected them.'
D. LimitationsImposed By Existing Precedent

Some commentators have also argued that the Twombly decision is
implicitly limited by prior precedent that the Court did not purport to
overrule. In particular, these commentators point to the Court's decision in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 15 9 as potentially constraining the reach of the
Twombly decision. Swierkiewicz addressed the viability of a civil rights

claim brought by an individual claiming ethnic origin discrimination. 60 The
Court held that "an employment discrimination complaint need not include"
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, but rather "must

contain only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."""'

In so ruling, the Court distinguished

between the standard for pleading an employment discrimination claim
153. Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1959).
154. Id.
155. As one court has explained, the Erickson Court "reversed a Tenth Circuit decision for
of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir.
requiring fact pleading." Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill.
2008).
156. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1973 n.14.
157. Id. at 1965 n.3, 1966.
158. See, e.g., Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) ("We do not read
Erickson to undermine Twombly's requirement that a pleading contain 'more than labels and
see also Dodson, supra note 144, at 140 ("Erickson reaffirmed Bell Atlantic's
conclusions ....');
requirement that the complaint provide notice plus grounds .... The two cases are looking at the
same standard ....");Spencer, supra note 2, at 456 (maintaining that while Erickson may "soften
the edges of Twombly, seeming to assure readers that not all of Conley's legacy has been discarded,"
its "homage to notice pleading and the liberal ethos ring hollow"). The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2009 WL 1361536 (U.S. May 18, 2009), likewise refutes this
interpretation. There, the Court reaffirmed the plausibility standard.
159. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
160. Id. at 509.
161. Id. at 508 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
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under Rule 8 and the standard for proving such a claim, which it articulated
in McDonnell Douglas.

However, nothing in Swierkiewicz is at odds with the majority's analysis
in Twombly. The Court in Swierkiewicz did not purport to address a
situation where the plaintiff's complaint was perfectly consistent with a lack
of liability. To the contrary, defendants' argument in Swierkiewicz was that
the complaint was too conclusory. 162 The Court rejected that argument
based on the particular allegations in the complaint, which made clear the
grounds upon which the plaintiff based his assertions of discrimination,
"detail[ing] the events leading to [plaintiffs] termination, provid[ing]
relevant dates, and includ[ing] the ages and nationalities of 1at
63 least some of
the relevant persons involved with [plaintiffs] termination.'
Indeed, the majority in Twombly repeatedly relied upon Swierkiewicz in
its opinion.' 64 The majority did not see anything inconsistent in its ruling
and the Swierkiewicz decision. Nor did it indicate that Swierkiewicz
imposed any limitations on the scope of its decision. To the contrary, it
rejected the arguments made by the dissenters who maintained that the two
decisions were irreconcilable and that the majority was in effect overruling
the Court's prior decision. 65 As the Court explained, "'Swierkiewicz did not
change the law of pleading, but simply reemphasized.., that the Second
Circuit's use of a heightened pleading standard for Title VII cases was
1 66
contrary to the Federal Rules' structure of liberal pleading requirements.'
Thus, again, the Court eschewed plaintiffs' assertion that it was requiring
"heightened fact pleading of specifics," reiterating that the plausibility test
was based on the plain language of Rule 8.167 In sum, decisions such as
Swierkiewicz provide no basis for imposing artificial limits on the Twombly
decision. To the contrary, these and other suggested limitations were

162. Id. at 514.
163. Id.
164. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1969, 1973 n.14 (2007) (citing
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 n.1, 514-15). Likewise, the dissent criticized the majority's ruling as
inconsistent with Swierkiewicz. See id. at 1982-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Everything today's
majority says would therefore make perfect sense if it were ruling on a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment and the evidence included nothing more than the Court has described. But it should go
without saying in the wake of Swierkiewicz that a heightened production burden at the summary
judgment stage does not translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage.").
165. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 (majority opinion).
166. Id. (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atd. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).
167. Id. at 1974.
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specifically raised and rejected by the Twombly majority.'68
III.

THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

The fundamental question with which courts have begun to grapple
since Twombly is the import and scope of the "plausibility" standard. 69 As
noted above, some courts and commentators have argued that the standard is
"vague."' 70 While such concerns are likely to dissipate with time and further
judicial construction, in fact they are largely unfair.'
A careful reading of
the Court's decision provides fairly clear guidelines for courts assessing
whether a complaint meets the requirements of Rule 8.
A.

Logical Coherence

The central theme of the plausibility standard is logical coherence. The
Twombly majority emphasized that plaintiffs' complaint was deficient
because it contained allegations that were fully consistent with the nonliability of the defendants.1 72 In doing so, the Court appeared to be
interpreting the Federal Rules as requiring that plaintiffs' allegations contain
a set of factual assertions that, if taken as true, are both necessary and
sufficient to establish defendants' liability. The allegations in Twombly did
not contain one necessary element-an "agreement" among the defendants
to restrain trade. Accordingly,
the Court found that such allegations were
173
insufficient to state a claim.

While certain courts and commentators have criticized the majority's
interpretation, it is consistent with common sense. A complaint that does
not contain allegations necessary and sufficient to warrant liability cannot
possibly contain the "showing" necessary to meet the requirements of Rule

168. See, e.g., id. at 1965, 1969, 1973 n.14.
169. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008) ("The most difficult
question in interpreting Twombly is what the Court means by 'plausibility."'); Phillips v. City of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) ("What makes Twombly's impact on the Rule 12(b)(6)
standard initially so confusing is that it introduces a new 'plausibility' paradigm for evaluating the
sufficiency of complaints.").
170. See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
171. That is not to say that courts have not misinterpreted Twombly. For example, in EEOC v.
Concentra Health Servs., Inc., a divided Seventh Circuit panel stated that Twombly "appears to hold
that the plaintiffs pleaded themselves out of court with detailed 'allegations of parallel conduct' that
did not plausibly suggest such a conspiracy." 496 F.3d 773, 778 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1963). However, as the concurrence observed, the majority in Twombly did
not dismiss plaintiffs' suit "because they pled too much detail," but rather "the Court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint because it did not plead enough." Id. at 783 n.l (Flaum, J.,
concurring) (citing
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-69).
172. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
173. Id. at 1973.
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8. There can be no "showing" of liability when plaintiffs' theory is filled
with logical holes or omits essential elements they must prove in order to
establish defendants' liability.
Nor does such an interpretation of the rules impose a requirement that
plaintiffs plead facts with added specificity. The problem the Court
addressed in Twombly is not one of specificity of the factual allegations, but
whether plaintiffs have pleaded the necessary elements to establish liability.
Requiring plaintiffs to plead each necessary element of their claims does not
impose a heightened pleading standard or return us to the days of "fact
pleading." Rather, it simply requires that plaintiffs include allegations in
their complaint that, if believed, are not merely consistent with liability or
non-liability, but rather affirmatively establish liability. In order to make the
"showing" required under Rule 8, plaintiffs must demonstrate that liability is
a necessary consequence of the allegations in their complaint.
The plausibility standard is also arguably dictated by the notice
requirement of Rule 8.174 While the majority did not rely on this aspect of
Rule 8, it further supports the majority's conclusion. A defendant cannot be
put "on notice" of the claim against it if a plaintiffs complaint is riddled
with logical gaps or is logically incoherent. It is only where the complaint
states a logically coherent theory of liability that a defendant is truly "on
notice" of the claim against it.
This analysis further undermines the dissent's objections to the
plausibility standard. While the dissent relied heavily on the notice
requirement of Rule 8, that requirement itself supports the plausibility
standard. The dissent's suggestion that notice pleading is inconsistent with a
plausibility standard is arguably based on a flawed conception of the notice
requirement. Logical coherence dictates something like a plausibility
requirement.
B.

The Insufficiency of Conclusory Allegations

However, there is another fundamental element that the Court
acknowledged in its decision-the requirement that a plaintiff state more

174. See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 ("This requirement of plausibility serves not only to weed out
claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect of success,
but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them."); Phillips, 515
F.3d at 232 (noting that "without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy
the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice,' but also the 'grounds' on which the
claim rests").
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than mere conclusions. 175 In one sense, conclusory allegations can be
logically coherent. If, for example, the plaintiffs in Twombly simply stated
that the defendants had committed "violations of the Sherman Act," that
allegation would be logically coherent. On the other hand, it would not be
particularly meaningful because the plaintiffs would not have stated the
fundamental elements necessary to establish the alleged violations. Also,
defendants would not be placed on notice regarding the facts that the
plaintiffs allege establish their claim. Moreover, is it really logically
coherent to simply state what amounts to a tautology-i.e., defendants are
liable because they have violated the law? Can plaintiffs evade the
requirement that they plead logically coherent theories by avoiding stating
any of the facts that support critical elements of their claims? In this sense,
such conclusory allegations fail to meet the logical coherence requirement.
Thus, there is another requirement under Twombly to state a legally
177
sufficient claim. 176 A plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations.
Whether one construes this as an additional requirement or merely one
aspect of logical coherence, the majority in Twombly made clear that logical
coherence was plainly required under Rule 8(a), which mandates that
78
plaintiffs make a "showing" that they are entitled to legal relief.
Conclusory allegations cannot constitute such a "showing." Nor do they in
any real sense put the defendant on "notice" of the plaintiffs' claims.
Merely assertingliability without alleging any factual basis cannot possibly
inform the defendant of the nature of plaintiffs' claims. Thus, such
conclusory allegations fail under the plain language of the rule.
The conceptual framework for addressing this problem is suggested in a
footnote in the Twombly decision.' 79 There, the Court described three
categories of allegations. 180 First, it noted that there was a line that must be
Conclusory
drawn between "conclusory" and "factual" allegations."'
allegations are plainly insufficient to establish a claim. 82 However, as noted
above, there are multiple reasons such allegations may be deemed
insufficient. 83 In Twombly, the majority seemed to be suggesting that
"conclusory" allegations were deficient because they could not be credited

175. This was a longstanding requirement under Rule 8 even before Twombly. See, e.g., Martin v.
Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 1990); Munz v. Parr, 758 F.2d 1254, 1259 (8th Cir. 1985);
Humey v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979).
176. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-66.
177. See id. at 1966.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
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Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966.
Id. at 1965 nn.4-5.
Id. at 1966 n.5.
See id. at 1966.
Id. at 1965-66.
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as "factual" in nature. 184 Under this rubric, the logical coherence test would
apply only after this threshold of pleading non-conclusory allegations was
satisfied.
It is the second dividing line between the last two categories of
allegations with which the Court in Twombly was primarily concerned: the
distinction between "factually neutral" allegations and "factually suggestive"
allegations. 85 As the Court observed, each of these dividing lines "must be
crossed to enter the realm of plausible."'' 86 The first line divided claims that
were essentially legal assertions from those that were factual allegations.
The factual allegation category then was subdivided into two subsets-187
"factually neutral" allegations and "factually suggestive" allegations.
Only the latter were sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements under
Rule 8(a). 8 8 Accordingly, plaintiffs must "nudge[] their claims across the
to plausible" in order to avoid dismissal of their
line from conceivable
89
complaints.1
IV.

TWOMBLYIN CONTEXT

To fully understand the Twombly decision, it must be viewed in the
context of the Court's other decisions regarding pleading standards. In
particular, the Court has issued a number of decisions in recent years that
have urged courts to apply more stringent scrutiny at the pleading stage.' 90
Twombly may be viewed largely as evidencing this broader trend, which
may be driven by concerns with the increasing costs of litigation in the
federal system.
A.

The Court's Recent DecisionsRegardingPleadingStandardsAnd Other
PotentialLimitations On Civil Claims

Contrary to the dissenting opinion and much of the early reaction to
Twombly, the Court's decision did not represent a sharp break with its prior
pleading jurisprudence. Rather, Twombly must be viewed as part of a
broader trend in which the Court recognizes the importance of imposing real

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1965.
See id. at 1966 n. 5.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1965-66.
Id. at 1974.
See infra notes 191-206 and accompanying text.
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and meaningful judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage, particularly as cases
become more costly and complex to litigate.
The Court itself recognized that its decision in Twombly flowed from its
prior pleadings decisions. It noted, for example, that it had previously
"alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement requirement
in Dura Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Broudo."'9 ' Dura Pharmaceuticalswas a
securities case in which the Court considered the requirements for pleading
loss causation. 192 As the majority observed in Twombly, the Court in Dura
Pharmaceuticalshad "explained that something beyond the mere possibility
of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless
claim be allowed to take up the time of a number of other people, with the
right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
' 193
value."

Indeed, the Court has been particularly active in enforcing rigorous
pleading requirements in the securities context. In its recent decision in
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 9 for example, the Court
considered the appropriate standard for pleading a "strong inference of
scienter" under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).
Under Section 211D(b)(2) of the PSLRA, plaintiffs were required to "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind."' 95 The lower federal courts had
offered differing
interpretations with respect to what this provision
196
required.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that "[i]t does not suffice
that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer from the complaint's
allegations the requisite state of mind.' ' 197 Instead, "a court ... must
consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff,... but also competing
inferences rationally drawn from the facts alleged.' 98 "A complaint will
survive

.

.. only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter

191. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)).
192. See generallyDuraPharms., 544 U.S. 336.
193. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347) (internal quotations
deleted).
194. 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2506 (2007).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
196. See, e.g., Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506 n.2.
197. Id. at 2504. As the majority explained,
An inference of fraudulent intent may be plausible, yet less cogent than other,
nonculpable explanations for the defendant's conduct. To qualify as "strong" within the
intendment of § 211D(b)(2). . . . an inference of scienter must be more than merely
plausible or reasonable-it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing
inference of nonfraudulent intent.
Id. at 2504-05.
198. Id. at 2504.

1092

[Vol. 36: 1063, 2009]

The Twombly Revolution?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw
from the facts alleged."' 99 In so ruling, the Court in Tellabs is generally
viewed as having increased the requirements for pleading scienter.20 °
While the Court in Tellabs was considering the appropriate pleading
standard under a congressional statute, 20' rather than the Federal Rules, the
Court discussed many of the same considerations that emerged in Twombly.
Thus, for example, the Court noted the importance of judicial scrutiny at the
pleadings stage in order to ensure that unnecessary costs are not imposed on
litigants or the courts, where a plaintiff's claim is insufficient to state a claim
as a matter of law. As the majority observed, "[p]rivate securities fraud
actions,... if not adequately contained, can be employed abusively to
impose substantial costs on companies and individuals whose conduct
conforms to the law.

20 2

The efficiencies to be derived from ensuring the

appropriate level of scrutiny at the pleading stage seemed to be foremost in
the minds of the majorities in both Twombly and Tellabs.
Moreover, it is significant that neither of these decisions were written by
the overtly "conservative" members of the Court who might be expected to
welcome increased scrutiny of plaintiffs' claims at the pleadings stage.
Rather, we find Justices Ginsburg and Souter writing the majority opinions,
making clear that the standards for assessing the pleadings must be taken
seriously and that there are significant institutional concerns associated
with
20 3
ensuring the appropriate level of scrutiny at the pleadings stage.
Viewed more broadly, the Court's decisions regarding pleading
standards can be viewed as part of a trend toward restricting the cases that
are allowed to be decided by the jury. The Court imposed stringent
standards for scrutinizing the reliability of proffered scientific evidence in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.2°4 In doing so, the Court

199. Id. at2510.
200. However, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence, the Court could have gone much further
and required plaintiffs to demonstrate more than mere equivalence between their proposed inference
and any opposing inference. See id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2516 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that "a 'strong inference' of scienter, in the present context, means an
inference that is more likely than not correct").
201. The majority made a point of noting that the PSLRA was specifically designed to act "[a]s a
check against abusive litigation by private parties" and that, in particular, "[e]xacting pleading
requirements are among the control measures Congress included in the PSLRA." Id. at 2504
(majority opinion).
202. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006)).
203.

See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955; see also Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. 2499.

204. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). In fact, the majority in Tellabs specifically made reference to
Daubert, observing that "[iun numerous contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations prevent
submission of claims to a jury's judgment without violating the Seventh Amendment." Tellabs, 127
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interpreted Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as charging judges
with acting as "gatekeepers" responsible for ensuring that only evidence that
is both reliable and relevant may be submitted to the jury.2 °5
Likewise, the Court has evidenced a trend toward interpreting statutory
preemption doctrines broadly to preclude juries from second-guessing
judgments made by federal regulators. The Court has heard a series of cases
in which it has suggested that it would interpret the scope of federal statutory
preemption broadly. Again, the Court has expressed a concern that juries
are not competent to assess complicated scientific questions that are better
left to expert regulators.20 6 While the Court's case law in this area is in flux,
it appears that this is another area in which the trend is toward increasing
judicial gatekeeping and applying more stringent scrutiny to the claims that
are allowed to proceed to trial.
B. Twombly In The Context of The Evolving Civil LitigationLandscape

The Court's decisions, including Twombly, must be viewed in the
context of the rules as a whole and the underlying dynamics within the civil
justice system. As the majority emphasized, judicial scrutiny of the pleading
provides an important counterbalance to the broad discovery authorized
under the Federal Rules. 20 7 The Federal Rules authorize wide-ranging
2
discovery in an effort to obtain accurate results in the litigation process. 01
The greater the discovery, the greater the likelihood that an accurate
outcome will be achieved in the litigation process. Nonetheless, this
accuracy comes at a cost. The greater the discovery, the greater the costsnot only monetary, but also in terms of the time spent by the parties and the
court. Judicial scrutiny of the pleadings serves an important gatekeeping
role in ensuring that such costs are incurred only where they are warrantedi.e., only where the plaintiff's claim is plausible and has some non-negligible

S. Ct. at 2512 n.8.
205. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
206. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 30-31, 42-43, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct.
1168 (2008) (No. 06-1498), 2008 WL 495030; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, 26, 37,
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179), 2007 WL 4241897.
207. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1975 (2007) ("Those concerns [which]
presumably explain the Court's departure from settled procedural law . . . . merit careful case
management, including strict control of discovery, careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage, and lucid instructions to juries; they do not, however, justify the dismissal of an
adequately pleaded complaint without even requiring the defendants to file answers denying a
charge that they in fact engaged in collective decisionmaking.") (footnote omitted).
208. These provisions have not been without controversy. See Redish, supra note 137, at 563
(observing that "[d]ispute was widespread at the time of the [discovery] process's adoption as part of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, which made discovery an instrumental part of the
revolutionary notice pleading system, and the debate has continued vigorously ever since" (footnote
omitted)).
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possibility of success.
These concerns have only increased with the proliferation of electronic
discovery.029 As records are increasingly stored in electronic media, parties
in litigation increasingly are faced with the burden of preserving, searching,
and producing voluminous materials during the course of the litigation-all
at significant costs. 21 The unique challenges of electronic discovery have
been catalogued by a variety of commentators. These challenges include the
sheer volume of electronic discovery, the difficulty of retrieving relevant
information while excluding irrelevant or privileged information from
discovery, and the form in which electronic information is produced.2 '
One way of addressing these concerns is through amendment of the
discovery rules. One could attempt to curb the potential abuses of discovery
by placing limits on the scope of discovery or other restrictions. Some
might argue that this has happened to a very limited extent with respect to
discovery of electronic information.212 In December 2006, the Federal Rules
were amended to take into account the unique aspects of electronic
discovery. Among other things, the rules now make a distinction between
"reasonably accessible" information and "inaccessible" information, making
the former subject to discovery without judicial order when "relevant and
non-privileged," while the latter is discoverable only upon a showing of
good cause and, even then, may be subject to certain conditions or
limitations.21 3 In addition, Rule 37 now contains a provision that allows a

209. See Amy J. Longo & Dale Cendali, Current Trends in Electronic Discovery, A.L.I.-A.B.A.
193, 197 (2007) ("The proliferation of electronic information has forever altered the way that parties
conduct litigation, particularly discovery."); Redish, supra note 137, at 564 (observing that "the
discovery of electronic evidence has assumed enormous importance in modem litigation").
210. Redish, supra note 137, at 581 (observing that "the costs and burdens that result from the[]
difficulties [associated with electronic discovery] can be of such a magnitude as to have a profound
and unpredictable impact on basic societal choices not directly involving the lawsuit").
211. See id. at 589; see also Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New
World or 1984?, 25 REV. LITIG. 633, 640-47 (2006).
212. But see Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on ElectronicDiscovery After December 1, 2006,
116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167, 174 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/82.pdf (arguing
that "[t]he rule amendments, and, more importantly, the features of electronic discovery that made
the amendments necessary in the first place, will place increasing demands on litigants, lawyers, and
judges to manage discovery earlier, more often, and in more detail than conventional discovery
required").
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B). The Advisory Committee notes provide some factors courts
may consider in determining whether discovery is nonetheless warranted, including:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information available from
other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information
that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed
sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that cannot be
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party to avoid discovery sanctions "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances"
where it has lost electronic information due to the routine operation of its
computer systems (as opposed to some purposeful effort to frustrate
discovery). 4 Rule 34 allows a party to specify the form in which electronic
information shall be produced; absent specification, it shall be produced as it
is "ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms. 2, 5 The
rules also encourage the parties to meet and confer at the outset of discovery
regarding a number of topics, including the preservation of electronic
information, the form in which electronic information shall be produced, and
procedures for preventing the inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information.2 16 Finally, if the parties are unable to agree on procedures
regarding the inadvertent production of privileged materials, Rule
26(b)(5)(B) provides default rules that allow a party to notify its opponent
that certain produced information is privileged, require the opposing party to
return such information or destroy it, and refrain from further disclosure of
the information until the court resolves the privilege claim. 21 7 As the
Advisory Committee notes observe, such provisions were particularly
critical given that, "[w]hen the review is of electronically stored information,
the risk of waiver, and the time and effort required to avoid it, can increase
substantially because of the volume of electronically stored information and
the difficulty
in ensuring that all information to be produced has in fact been
218
reviewed.

obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance
and usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation; and (7) the parties' resources.
They further note that "[t]he decision whether to require a responding party to search for and
produce information that is not reasonably accessible depends not only on the burdens and costs of
doing so, but also on whether those burdens and costs can be justified in the circumstances of the
case." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment.
214. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of
the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system."). But see Rosenthal, supra
note 212, at 190 (arguing that there may be "increased sanctions motions" under the new rules
because "judges seeking effective control over electronic discovery may impose unrealistically
stringent demands on litigants and lawyers, which will predictably lead to an increase in sanctions
motions if parties cannot meet the demands").
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
216. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(3)-(4). The Advisory Committee notes observe that "[t]he particular
issues regarding electronically stored information that deserve attention during the discovery
planning stage depend on the specifics of the given case." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)-(4) advisory
committee's note. The rules also encourage courts to address "disclosure or discovery of
electronically stored information" at the Rule 16 pre-trial conference. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). This
provision "is designed to alert the court to the possible need to address the handling of discovery of
electronically stored information early in the litigation if such discovery is expected to occur." FED.
R. Crv. P. 16(b)(3) advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment.
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B).
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment.
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These provisions provide some protection for a party faced with massive
discovery; nonetheless they do not go particularly far. The Federal Rules
still provide for wide-ranging discovery even in the context of electronic
information. 21 9 The costs of such discovery are well-documented and will
only increase over time. 220 Thus, this mechanism has not provided a means
for checking the potential costs of discovery. Nor, as the Twombly majority
observed, is it necessarily the most effective mechanism. 221 Frequently,
judges simply are not in a position to impose real limitations on discovery
given their limited resources and knowledge regarding the substantive
aspects of the litigation.222 Accordingly, it is not clear that such amendments
can provide an effective check on discovery abuse. Finally, one could
debate whether restricting discovery is the most appropriate mechanism for
balancing the costs and benefits of litigation. Arguably, judicial scrutiny of
the pleadings followed by discovery for those claims that survive this
threshold stage in the litigation is superior. 223 Across-the-board restrictions
on discovery will apply to both those claims that have merit and those that
do not. In contrast, strengthening pleading standards will target those claims
with little or no merit while not disadvantaging those with merit. Utilizing
limits on discovery as a means of controlling litigation costs may unduly
disadvantage plaintiffs with meritorious claims.
V.

CRITICISMS OF THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

Viewed within this framework, many of the criticisms of the majority's
decision in Twombly fall by the wayside. The Court's decision is fully
consistent with the text of the rules as well as their underlying rationale. As
such, it articulates a standard that is neither "vague" nor "confusing,,' 224 nor
a "startling" deviation from existing precedent.225 Rather, Twombly is part
of a broader trend that recognizes the important role of the judge as

219. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a).
220. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (citing William H. Wagener, Note,
Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in PrivateAntitrust Litigation, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1887, 1898-99 (2003); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 30 (2004);
Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Anthony
J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999), 192 F.R.D. 354,
357 (2000).
221. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1967 & n.6 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 638).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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gatekeeper.

First, the plausibility standard does not represent a deviation from
traditional notice pleading.226 As noted above, the plausibility standard
properly understood is a necessary component of the notice requirement.227

There cannot be notice without the logical coherence enforced under the
plausibility rule. Accordingly, Twombly does not represent a deviation from
traditional principles of notice pleading properly construed. This conclusion
does not undermine the significance of the Court's decision, however. The
Court essentially ratified a trend in the lower federal courts to increase the

scrutiny applied to the pleadings.228 By doing so, it sought to ensure that
judges act as vigorous gatekeepers.

Moreover, the scrutiny Twombly

requires is mandated by the Federal Rules. While the notice pleading
standard has been characterized as "liberal,"22 9 it is not so liberal that it
would allow pleadings that are riddled with logical flaws or gaps to survive a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Second, the plausibility standard does not overturn settled precedent.23 °

To the contrary, it is in line with the Court's recent approach to pleading
standards. To the extent the Court purported to "overrule" precedent at all, it

merely overruled a heavily criticized and poorly worded formulation of the
Rule 8(a) standard in Conley.231 In doing so, however, the Court was merely
enforcing the directive in the Federal Rules and ratifying the reality within
the federal courts, which had eschewed the hyper-literal reading of the
Conley language.232

226. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. See supranote 174 and accompanying text.
228. As Professor Fairman explained, notice pleading was largely a "myth" given the actual
practice in the federal courts:
Notwithstanding its foundation in the Federal Rules and repeated Supreme Court
imprimatur, notice pleading is a myth. From antitrust to environmental litigation,
conspiracy to copyright, substance specific areas of law are riddled with requirements of
particularized fact-based pleading. To be sure, federal courts recite the mantra of notice
pleading with amazing regularity. However, their rhetoric does not match the reality of
federal pleading practice. Sometimes subtle, other times overt, federal courts in every
circuit impose non-Rule-based heightened pleading in direct contravention of notice
pleading doctrine.
Christopher Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.987, 988 (2003). See also
Ides, supra note 145, at 604 (observing that "lower federal courts more than occasionally inhale the
mantra of simplified pleading and exhale a heightened pleading standard"); Spencer, supra note 2, at
432 (noting that "the Court's move in th[e] direction [of plausibility pleading] is consistent with
long-held sentiment among the lower federal courts").
229. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1973 (majority opinion).
230. See id. at 1977-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spencer, supra note 2, at 460 (agreeing with
Twombly dissent that the majority's decision is based on "an untenable interpretation of Rule 8(a)
that is wholly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent").
231. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
232. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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Third, the plausibility standard is consistent with the Federal Rules as
construed as a whole. 233 The majority correctly stated that its formulation
did not impose a "heightened" pleading standard.3 Accordingly, it did not
undermine Rule 9's requirement of additional specificity in certain
categories of cases, nor other provisions of the Federal Rules designed to
address the problem of a lack of specificity in the pleadings, such as Rule
12(e). 235 Rather, viewed in context, the Twombly decision merely reinforces
the importance of the Rule 8(a) pleading standard as the gateway to further
proceedings under the generous discovery provisions of the Federal Rules.
One of the (but not the only) counterweights to liberal discovery under the
Federal Rules is stringent judicial scrutiny at the pleadings stage. 6
Accordingly, the Twombly ruling is supportedby the structure of the Federal
Rules when considered as a whole.
Finally, the plausibility standard does not represent the triumph of
policy considerations over the text of the rules.23 7 The majority properly
stated that the plausibility standard flowed from the text of Rule 8.23 It is
supported not only by the rule's requirement of a "showing" but also fair
"notice" to the opposing parties. 239 As such, it is not merely a policy-based
standard. Nonetheless, it does advance important policies that underlie the
Federal Rules.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The full scope and effect of Twombly has yet to play out in the courts.
Nonetheless, faithful adherence to the Court's decision would have
potentially sweeping effects. The Court has made clear that federal courts
must scrutinize complaints to ensure that they are not conclusory and that
they allege facts that, if taken as true, are necessary and sufficient to
establish plaintiffs' claims. 240 Likewise, it has made clear that this scrutiny

233. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1984 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Spencer, supra note 2, at 461,47089 (arguing that Twombly "offered an interpretation of Rule 8 that simply does not fit with the liberal
provisions of the Federal Rules as a whole").
234. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.14.
235. Id. (distinguishing Rule 9's requirement that allegations be "particularized" from the
plausibility standard).
236. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1975, 1989.
238. Id. at 1966 (majority opinion).
239. See id. at 1959.
240. Id. at 1965.
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is required under the plain language of Rule 8(a).24 1
The proposed limitations on the Twombly decision simply lack support.
While judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage may be particularly warranted
in antitrust and other complex cases, which threaten to impose significant
discovery costs on defendants, there is simply no basis in either the Court's
decision or the plain language of the rules for such case-specific limitations.
The Federal Rules apply equally to all cases and do not purport to make such
distinctions. Moreover, the Court's analysis was based primarily not on
such policy considerations, but its interpretation of the plain meaning of the
language of Rule 8.242 Accordingly, faithful adherence to the Twombly
decision will have potentially wide-ranging effects.
Nonetheless, one cannot discount the important policy implications of
Twombly or its place in the broader context of modem civil litigation.
Decisions such as Daubert and Twombly, which mandate greater judicial
involvement in assessing the merits of plaintiffs' claims at early stages of the
litigation are increasingly important in our modem civil justice system.
Given the exploding costs of civil litigation and expanding discovery
obligations, the risk that settlements may be based not on the merits of a
particular case, but rather the in terrorem value of a lawsuit, has only
increased.2 43 Thus, the Court has correctly observed in a variety of contexts
that increasing judicial scrutiny is likely to have important and beneficial
offsetting effects with respect to other trends in modem civil litigation.2 "
This is not to say that these trends are necessarily undesirable.
Increased discovery may lead to more accurate and just outcomes in certain
circumstances as parties are able to obtain the facts necessary to fully prove
their claims. Nonetheless, one cannot discount the costs associated with
such developments and the need for some checks and balances to offset
potential abuses. Accordingly, Twombly represents an important structural
development under the Federal Rules, which is likely to improve
adjudicative outcomes.

241. Id. at 1966.
242. See generally id.
243. Id. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244.
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See generally id.

